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CLEANING UP THE LEGAL DEBRIS LEFT IN THE WAKE OF
WHITEWATER

SUSAN LOW BLOCH
We have learned a lot in the twenty-five years since Watergate. During
the scandal itself, we confirmed that the President is not above the law. We
learned that executive privilege is constitutionally protected, but that it is not
absolute. 1 And, we learned that a need exists for an independent counsel, but
that we don't necessarily need a statute to establish such an office.
Watergate and the Nixon era spawned several so-called "reforms": the establishment of the independent counsel statute, 2 presidential immunity from
civil damage suits for official action, 3 and public ownership of the President's
official papers. 4 It is interesting and appropriate, on the silver anniversary of
these events, to evaluate these reforms: are they shining sterling or tarnished
mistakes? What have we learned in the twenty-five years since Watergate?
I submit we have learned several important lessons.
First, it is dangerous to sue a sitting President as if he were an ordinary
citizen.
Second, it is dangerous to have an independent counsel statute, at least as
it is presently constructed.
Finally, the evidentiary privileges related to the Office of the President are
extremely complex and in need of clarification.
The recent events involving Bill Clinton, Kenneth Starr, Monica Lewinsky, Paula Jones et al. have raised complicated and important questions. It is
difficult to decide them in the heat of battle, especially when the stakes are

I. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
2. The independent counsel act was initially passed in 1978 as a five-year measure. See
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§
591-598 (1982)). In 1982, it was extended under the Ethics in Government Act Amendments of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1988)).
In 1987, it was extended again under the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (Supp. 1991)).
Most recently, it was re-authorized in 1994 and will expire in 1999 under the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732 (codified as amended at 28
u.s.c. §§ 590-599 (1994)).
3. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, (1982).
4. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, (1977).
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high for the country and our system of government. To be sure, the courts
must deal with these issues as they arise, as they have done. But, overall, it is
unfortunate that the courts have had to decide these difficult questions in the
midst of what can accurately be called a political war. I hope that Congress
will revisit some of these questions in the abstract and with distance, rather
than in the throes of battle.
The following are some of the proposals I would recommend to Congress:
First, Congress should consider enacting a law providing presidents with
temporary immunity from civil damage actions while they are in office. Recent events make it clear that one cannot sue a sitting President as if he is an
ordinary citizen. Doubters should ask the following question: is there any
other defendant who, after winning on summary judgment, might nonetheless
face impeachment and be willing to pay $850,000 to settle a suit most people
believe lacks merit?
Second, Congress should reconsider the wisdom and necessity of the independent counsel statute. Conventional wisdom is that Watergate taught us that
we needed an independent counsel statute. The irony is that Watergate was
resolved without such a statute. I believe most people think the investigation
and resolution of Watergate was reasonably bipartisan and responsible. In my
opinion, the same cannot be said, so far, of the ongoing investigation of
Whitewater and the Lewinsky matter.
Third, Congress should reexamine the various privilege issues that have
arisen in the context of the Starr investigation of President Clinton. Thiee different privileges were litigated during this period: executive privilege, attorney-client privilege, and a protective function privilege for Secret Service
agents. The courts addressed each issue as it arose, as they were required to
do. But I would urge Congress to dispassionately examine these privilege issues in what, hopefully, will be a calm after the present storm.
Allow me to discuss these suggestions individually.
First, I believe the Supreme Court was wrong when it held in Clinton v.
Jones that civil damage suits against a sitting president can proceed while he is
in office. 5 I have argued since Paula Jones first filed her case in 1994 that the
suit should be delayed until the President is out of office. 6 Relying on Nixon v.
Fitzgerald/ where the Supreme Court inferred an absolute immunity for presidents for civil damage actions based on official conduct, I and several other
constitutional law scholars filed an amicus brief in the Jones case, arguing that
sitting presidents should have temporary immunity from such damage actions

5. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681,705-06 (1997).
6. Susan Low Bloch, Editorial, Constitutional Balancing Test, WASH. POST, June II, 1994,
at A20.
7. 457 u.s. 731, (1982).
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while they are in office. 8 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court disagreed. The
Court emphasized the aspect of the Nixon decision that expressed concern
about the adverse effects such suits could have on the president's ability to
make difficult decisions in his official capacity. 9 The Court downplayed the
other aspects of Nixon that worried about the distracting effects such suits
could have on the president's ability to perform generally .10 The Court in
Jones concluded that there was little reason to fear a "deluge" of civil suits and
that such suits could proceed without being unduly distracting. 11 The Court
asserted: " ... if properly managed by the District Court, it appears to us highly
unlikely [that the Paula Jones case will] occupy any substantial amount of [the
President's] time." 12
I would submit that the events since the Supreme Court's decision in May
1997 have proven the Court's prediction naive and wrong. The litigation involving Paula Jones has distracted the President, and the country, for a considerable time. Without the case, we may never have known about Kathleen
Willey and Monica Lewinsky, two women whose identity surfaced only during the avid discovery pursued by Paula Jones's lawyers. One might argue
that District Judge Susan Webber Wright could have limited discovery, but our
discovery process is notoriously wide-ranging. Had the President been temporarily immune from the Paula Jones litigation, we probably would have learned
of Lewinsky, not in the middle of the President's term, but only after he was
out of office. Had we learned of her later when Clinton was no longer president, then only Clinton, not the whole country, would pay the price. The
Court was wrong to worry only about a deluge of such suits. What the current
crisis makes abundantly clear is that· a single suit is enough to distract and
maybe destroy a Presidency. We now have a new dangerous political weapon,
and we must do what we can to dismantle it.
Obviously, President Clinton must bear much of the blame for providing
the fodder for these investigations. That, however, does not explain why the
country must be held hostage. All these salacious details could have been investigated after the President left office. Then only he, and not the whole
country, would have been distracted and punished.
But it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will revisit this question of
temporary immunity for the presidency. So I am hopeful that Congress will
seriously consider the Supreme Court's suggestion in the Jones case, that if

8.
1853).
1996).
9.
10.
11.
12.

Amicus Brief for Petitioner, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (U.S. S.Ct 1997) (No. 95Amicus Brief for Appellant/Cross-appellee, Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir.
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 701-03.
ld. at 705-08.
/d. at 702, 708.
/d. at 702.
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Congress believes the president should have temporary protection from civil
suits while in office, Congress should enact some form of temporary immunity.13 Let me stress that such protection would be for the benefit of the country and the office of the Presidency, not for the particular incumbent. Specifically, I would urge Congress to establish something like the law it enacted
years ago to protect soldiers in the military. Under the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act of 1940, the government provides immunity from suits for the
military while they are in active duty. 14
Such temporary immunity would not put the President above the law. Indeed, the Supreme Court in the Jones case specifically noted that the President
was not seeking to be placed "above the law." 15 The right to invoke temporary
immunity would simply recognize the President's "unique status in the constitutional scheme." 16 Unlike the other two branches, the Executive Branch is
represented by only one individual, the President of the United States. The
irony is that by not giving the President some form of temporary immunity, the
President winds up with fewer rights and less protection than the average defendant. Because of political constraints, it is much more difficult for the
President to engage in legal strategies, rely on hair-splitting definitions, or invoke constitutional privilege such as the right against self-incrimination, tactics that are lawful, common, and acceptable approaches for the average defendant. The experience our country has endured since the Supreme Court
held that Paula Jones could proceed has not been good for the Office of the
Presidency or for the country. 17 The most effective remedy to protect future
presidents from politically inspired lawsuits while they are in office is for
Congress to adopt some form of temporary immunity for sitting presidents.
Second, I would urge Congress to repeal the independent counsel statute,
or at least substantially modify it. I now believe that Justice Scalia was right
in Morrison v. Olson 18 when he warned us of the dangers of the independent
counsel statute. He was incredibly prophetic when he asked "what if they [the
judges appointing the independent counsel] are politically partisan ... and se-

13. /d. at 709 (stating "[i]f Congress deems it appropriate to afford the President stronger
protection, it may respond with appropriate legislation.").
14. See Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, ch. 888, 54 Stat. 1178 (1940)(codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 501 (1988), amended by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. I 02-12, 105 Stat. 34). Originally intended to protect soldiers
from default judgments against them while fighting World War II, the act, as amended over the
years, generally suspends civil actions against active-duty military personnel. Like any law that
would grant the President temporary immunity, it recognizes that civil actions should be delayed
to accommodate greater national purposes.
15. 520 U.S. at 697.
16. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 749.
17. It is also not fair to the individual who happens to hold the office.
18. 487 u.s. 654 (1988).
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lect a prosecutor antagonistic to the administration, or even to the particular
individual who has been selected for this special treatment?" 19
As you know, the statute sunsets on June 30, 1999. If Congress cannot
agree on a revision, it will expire and disappear. Others in this symposium
will address in depth the specifics of the act and how it should be modified.
Let me briefly describe several modifications I would suggest, if Congress decides to re-enact some type of independent counsel statute.
First, I would reduce the number of officials who can be targets of an independent counsel investigation. Specifically, an independent counsel should
be considered to investigate alleged wrongdoing only by the President, Vice
President, and the Attorney General. For the investigation of alleged wrongdoing by other cabinet officials, I believe we can trust the Department of Justice.
Second, I would give the Attorney General more tools with which to conduct the initial investigation and would raise the triggering threshold, making
referral to an Independent Counsel more difficult. 20
Third, I would provide time limits and budgetary constraints on the Independent Counsel's investigation. Any extensions ofthese limits would have to
be petitioned for, justified, and sanctioned by the appointing officials. This
would allow for some reasonable, public check on the investigation.
Fourth, I would consider putting the appointment power in officials other
than judges. The Starr investigation shows how the power to appoint and
control the independent counsel can have a tarnishing effect on the judiciary,
making it appear too political.
Finally, I would reconsider the wisdom and constitutionality of the provision in the independent counsel statute that requires the independent counsel,
if he or she finds "substantial and credible information ... that may constitute
grounds for an impeachment," to send a referral to the House of Representatives.21 I believe this delegation of congressional authority to the independent
counsel is constitutionally suspect and dangerous. Specifically, it entrusts too
much of the House's constitutional responsibility to decide whether to initiate
an impeachment inquiry to the independent counsel who is unelected and unaccountable.22 Once the independent counsel drives his van to the steps of the
House of Representatives and drops his 36 boxes of "evidence," it is very difficult for the House to decide quietly that there is nothing impeachable in the
boxes. The House is virtually forced to vote to start an impeachment inquiry.

19. /d. at 730 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. For a detailed discussion of the changing triggering mechanism, see Jack Maskell, The
Independent Counsel Law, FED. LAW. July 1998, at 29.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 595(c)(1994).
22. See Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Interaction Between Impeachment and the Independent
Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193,2226-65 (1998).
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That distorts the impeachment process, which is designed to be a dispute between the two elected branches, Congress and the President. Indeed, it is no
accident that the Constitution vests "the sole power to impeach" in the branch
most accountable to the people, ~he House of Representatives which faces the
electorate every two years. The use of an unaccountable intermediary to trigger impeachment transforms and grossly distorts the process. A decision to
initiate an impeachment inquiry should be a more difficult, and more carefully
thought-out process, than what we witnessed in the Fall of 1998 when the
House voted to initiate an impeachment inquiry. 23
At a minimum, I would make the referral to the House non-mandatory.
But is that alone sufficient? I'm not sure. The report of Leon Jaworski's investigation and the Grand Jury's Report and Recommendation on Watergate
were sent to the House Judiciary Committee without an independent counsel
statute. 24 And if one believes, as I do, that a sitting president cannot be criminally indicted and tried, 25 but that he can be investigated, then it is not clear
what the investigator should do if he finds evidence of impeachable offenses.
This is an issue warranting further study. Whether or not a new independent
counsel statute gets enacted next year, we know from the Jaworski experience
in the Nixon investigation that this question may still arise even without an independent counsel statute.
Lastly, we should consider, in the event a special prosecutor or independent counsel decides to send a referral to the Congress, what to do with grand
jury materials that are traditionally required to be secret under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 6(e).Z6 Starr's decision to tum the materials
over to the House, ostensibly with the approval of the Special Division that
appointed him, was in my opinion questionable. Normally, exemptions from
Rule 6(e) must be sought from the presiding judge. 27 Thus, I am' unsure why
Independent Counsel Starr sought approval from the Special Division instead
of the presiding judge, Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson, other than the

23. For an excellent summary of the events, see ASSOCIATED PRESS, Chronology of Events
(visited June 6, 1999) <http:/Kyle.seattletimes.com/presidentlchronology/index.html>.
24. See In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of Evidence to the House of Representatives, 370 F.Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974).
25. Is a Sitting President Subject to Compulsory Criminal Process?, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (Sept.!}, 1998) (statement of Susan Low Bloch, Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center).
26. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
27. See FED. R: CRIM. P. 6(e). In the Watergate investigation, the presiding judge, John
Sirica, explicitly authorized the release of otherwise secret grand jury proceedings. See In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of Evidence to
the House of Representatives, 370 F.Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974). See also JOHN J. SIRICA, To
SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE BREAK-IN, THE TAPES, THE CONSPIRATORS, THE PARDON 21618(1979).
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obvious possible explanation that the Special Division would be easier to persuade than Judge Johnson. Moreover, Congress's decision to put the report on
the internet, without even reading or screening it was, to say the least, questionable.28 We must, after the current controversy is resolved, consider these
issues dispassionately.
Finally, after examining the questions raised by presidential immunity and
the indepe~dent counsel statute, Congress should reexamine the various privilege issues that arose in the course of the Whitewater investigation: executive
privilege, attorney-client privilege, 29 and a protective function privilege.
With respect to executive privilege, there is little that Congress can or
should do. In the case of United States v. Nixon, 30 the Supreme Court established a constitutionally protected executive privilege, but the President's need
for confidentiality must be balanced against the grand jury's need for information relevant to a criminal investigation. 31 In the Starr investigation, when
Bruce Lindsey invoked executive privilege, Chief Judge Johnson emphasized
that conversations between the president and his aides are presumptively
privileged. 32 Significantly, she rejected Starr's argument that executive privilege cannot apply to discussions regarding private conduct. 33 But, relying on
United States v. Nixon, Judge Johnson found that the claim of privilege would
have to yield to the grand jury's need for the information. 34 That judgment
followed Nixon and thus left little that Congress can or should do with respect
to executive privilege.
Regarding the claim of attorney-client privilege for government attorneys,
Judge Johnson was confronted with three different views. The White House
argued the existence of an absolute attorney-client privilege between the
President and White House Counsel. 35 The Independent Counsel argued that
no such privilege was available at all? 6 The Department of Justice, in an ami-

28. Ken Starr has said that he was surprised to see the House release the Report without ever
reading it and regrets not doing more to prevent "the total and immediate public release of the
details." 20-20: Interview with Diane Sawyer (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 25, 1998).
29. One question regarding attorney-client privilege that Starr raised, the question of
whether the privilege survives the death of the client, was definitively answered by the Supreme
Court and need not be reassessed by Congress. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the
privilege survives the death of the client. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399
(1998).
30. 418 u.s. 683 (1974).
31. /d.at711-12.
32. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp.2d 21, 25,27 (D.D.C. 1998).
33. /d. at 25.
34. /d. at 28.
35. /d. at 33 (stating that "The White House claims that candid legal advice will be chilled if
the Court does not recognize an absolute governmental attorney-client privilege in the federal
grand jury context.").
36. !d. at 34.
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cus brief, took a middle position that the judge ultimately adopted. 37 Specifically, Judge Johnson held thatthe President possesses an attorney-client privilege when consulting with White House counsel. 38 But, she concluded that the
privilege was qualified, not absolute; the privilege may be overcome when a
prosecutor presenting a case before a federal grand jury can show a sufficient
need for the subpoenaed communication, and the inability to get the information from other sources. 39
The President appealed the question of attorney-client privilege to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 40 In a 2-1 decision, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the District Court's ruling that Lindsey had to testify, but
on grounds that significantly narrowed the District Court's view of the privilege.41 The majority held that no attorney-client privilege exists between the
President and White House Counsel if the communications contain information of possible criminal offenses. 42 It rejected the District Judge's use of a
balancing test. 43
The White House petitioned for certiorari and on November 9, 1998, the
Supreme Court denied the petition, with two justices, Ginsburg and Breyer,
dissenting from the denial. In their view, the issue was sufficiently important
and difficult to warrant the Court's attention. 44
In light of the Supreme Court's refusal to address the issue, at least at this
time, it is particularly important that Congress do so. Specifically, Congress
should study the question of attorney-client privilege for government employ37. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp.2d. at 32 (citing and summarizing the Attorney
General's amicus brief).
38. /d. at 33-4.
39. /d. at 33, 36-7.
40. The President appealed Judge Johnson's decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in the case of In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir.
1998), contesting both her ruling as to executive privilege and her ruling on the question of attorney client privilege. The Independent Counsel sought expedited consideration by the United
States Supreme Court. In response, the President decided to drop the appeal of the executive
privilege aspect of the case but continued to defend the claim of attorney-client privilege. His
decision to drop the executive privilege claim was not surprising. The District Judge's construction of executive privilege was generous, and her balancing followed the Supreme Court decision
in United States v. Nixon. The Supreme Court was unlikely either to grant cert on that issue or to
give a more expansive construction of executive privilege.
The Supreme Court rejected Starr's request for expedited consideration, United States v. Clinton,
118 S.Ct. 2079 (1998), and therefore the appeal with respect to attorney client privilege for government lawyers continued in the Court of Appeals.
41. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1101.
42. !d. at 1114.
43. /d. at 1119 (Tate!, C.J. dissenting from Part II & concurring in part and dissenting in part
from Part III).
44. Office of President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 119 S.Ct. 466 (1998). See infra
note 46 and accompanying text.
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ees who confide in government lawyers. It should invite testimony from government attorneys who can describe the nature and extent of the problem and
how they think it should be resolved. This is a very difficult question and
should be resolved only with the benefit of past experiences by government
attorneys. 45
It is particularly important to address the question with respect to the relationship between White House Counsel and the President. As the Starr investigation made clear, impeachment is always a possibility, and that may influence the judgment about the necessity for and extent of the protection of legal
advice provided to the President. The critical question in this analysis is who is
the client? There are several possible answers: the United States, the Office of
the President, the President. I think all will agree that White House Counsel
does not represent the President as an individual. At most, White House
Counsel represents the Office of the President or the President in an official
capacity. To say that it represents the United States is too broad, especially
when one contemplates the possibility of impeachment proceedings. During
an impeachment, it is the Congress versus the Office of the President. Congress has its attorneys and one would think the President should have one, too,
presumably White House Counsel. Each lawyer represents his own branch;
neither represents the United States. If this is the case, then a basis exists for
the argument that all conversations between the President and White House
Counsel should be presumptively privileged, because, as we can see from the
Starr investigation, an investigation of the President can easily turn into an impeachment inquiry. It seems odd to consider a privilege corning into effect
only after an impeachment inquiry is imminent or announced. As Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg noted in their dissent from the denial of certiorari in the
Lindsey case:
The divided decision of the Court of Appeals makes clear that the question
presented by this petition has no clear legal answer and is open to serious legal
debate .... Whether or when other opportunities for this Court to consider the
issue arise depends upon whether or when the President, or other Government
employees, will risk disclosing to Government lawyers significant matters that,
under the Court of Appeals' decision, are not privileged. They may very well
choose the cautious course, holding back information from Government counsel, perhaps hiring outside lawyers instead. I believe that this Court, not the
Court of Appeals, should establish controlling legal principle in this disputed
matter of law, of importance to our Nation's governance. 46

For the reasons given by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, Congress should examine this difficult and very important question.

45. The Congress just recently created a new privilege between taxpayers and tax practitioners in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. I 05-206, 112 Stat. 685.
46. 119 S.Ct. at 466.
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The third privilege litigated in the Starr investigation is the protective
function privilege for Secret Service agents who protect the President. When
Starr subpoenaed several Secret Service agents, the Department of the Treasury, the agency responsible for the Secret Service, asserted this privilege.
They argued that if agents were required to testify against the President, future
presidents would keep them at a distance and thus jeopardize the President's
safety and the nation's security. 47
Both the District Court48 and the Court of Appeals49 rejected the claim of
such a privilege, and the Treasury petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court rejected the petition, 50 a response that was not surprising and, in
fact, one that I predicted. 51 While the issue is important, no conflict existed in
the circuits (since this was a case of first impression) and the government's argument was weak. It was crippled by the President's failure to assert the
privilege as his own. I understand why politically the President did not want
to assert another privilege, but without him, the claim is strained. Most privileges are between two people, designed to protect and foster candid conversations, and thereby preserve the relationship. Thus, for example, privileges exist between attorney and client, doctor and patient, and husband and wife. 52
The oddity with the asserted protective function privilege is that it is not designed to protect candid conversations between a secret service agent and anyone else. The sought-after privilege is to enable the President to have candid
conversations with whomever he pleases, viewing the secret service agent,
who by law is required to be by the President's side,53 as mere "wallpaper." It
seems essential, therefore, that the privilege be controlled not by the wallpaper, but by the President, waivable and assertable as he chooses. Under the
logic presented in the Court of Appeals and in the petition to the Supreme
Court, the Secret Service and subsequent Presidents could waive a prior President's protection; but that possibility would likely make sitting Presidents keep
his protectors at a distance and thus undermine the whole reason for establishing the protective function privilege in the first place. Only if the President
can control the waiving of the privilege, even when he is no longer in office,
will he feel comfortable with his bodyguard so close to his side. 54
I suspect many people believe there should be some limits on the ability of

47. In reSealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam), petition for cert.
denied, No. 98-93 (U.S. July 16, 1998).
48. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148 (NJH), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7734, at *15*17 (D.D.C. May 22, 1998).
49. In reSealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1077.
50. Rubin v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998).
51. Presentation of this paper at St. Louis University on Oct. 16, 1998.
52. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 507 n.13 (4th ed., 1996).
53. 18 u.s.c. §305(b) (1994).
54. Susan Low Bloch, When the Secret Service Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1998, at 15.
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prosecutors to haul Secret Service agents into court to testify about the President's private activities. The problem is that it is difficult, although not impossible, for the judiciary to craft such protection and to articulate its extent and
limitations. Congress, the creator of the Secret Service and the institution that
mandates the Service's responsibility . to protect the President, is better
equipped to define such protection. Obviously, it is too late to do much to
protect President Clinton, but I am hopeful that Congress will see the desirability of addressing the question for future executives.
One more issue that I hope Congress can address is the question of accession to the Office of the Presidency. Under the Presidential Succession Act,
the order of succession is as follows: Vice President, Speaker of the.House and
then President of t~e Senate Pro Tempore. 55 The events of this past year have
made me realize that it is at best odd, and perhaps even unconstitutional, to
have someone in line for the presidency-the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate-with a significant role in the impeachment and removal of those he would replace. I think, at a minimum, Congress should reconsider the wisdom of this.
In conclusion, let me say that when Professor Joel Goldstein called me last
year, in the fall of 1997,"to invite me to this symposium evaluating what we
have learned on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Watergate, I had no idea how
clairvoyant he was. Who would have thought he could orchestrate an impeachment inquiry to fall right in the middle of this conference~ I hope that
next time Joel plans a conference, he tries to anticipate and evaluate the potential unintended consequences. I got particularly nervous when I heard that
Joel was planning a conference next year to celebrate the 50th anniversary of
· "War ofthe Worlds."
ADDENDUM
Since this symposium was held in October 1998, the impeachment process
has continued and culminated in a vote on December 19, 1998 to impeach
President Clinton. It is ~oo early to predict the eventual outcome, but these
events clearly make it imperative that we reassess many of the questions raised
in this paper and in the Symposium generally.

55. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)- (b).
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